How can the Centre still stall state laws after SC’s verdict?

Supreme Court has clipped Governor’s powers, but the Centre still holds tools to delay or derail state legislations. This is how it works

By Sanjay Dubey

The Supreme Court has drawn clear lines: Governors cannot sit indefinitely on bills passed by elected state legislatures. In a recent case involving the Tamil Nadu government, the Court ruled that a Governor must act on a bill—either by giving assent or withholding it—within a reasonable time frame. Delays cannot be open-ended.

More importantly, the Court clarified that if a bill is withheld or returned to the legislature for reconsideration and subsequently re-passed by the Assembly, the Governor is constitutionally obligated to grant assent. The Governor cannot then send the bill for the President’s consideration. This ruling is expected to have long-term implications for Centre-State relations, particularly in states where the Governor and the elected government are politically opposed.

The judgment has narrowed the discretionary space available to Governors. But does that mean the central government can no longer influence, delay, or derail the legislative agenda of a state? Do Governors—and through them, the Centre—still have any constitutional or political tools at their disposal?

According to Article 200 of the Constitution, when a bill is presented, the Governor can do one of four things: give assent; withhold assent; return it to the legislature for reconsideration; or reserve it for the President’s consideration.

Article 200 also stipulates that if a bill is re-passed by the legislature, the Governor must give assent. However, the Constitution does not specify a time frame for any of these steps. Taking advantage of this silence, Governors have often sat on bills for years without taking action. With the Supreme Court’s recent ruling, that loophole has been narrowed. So what can a Governor still do to influence the process—either to stop the state from doing something wrong or to please political masters in Delhi?

They can no longer permanently stall a bill on their own. But it’s not as if they are powerless. A Governor can still become a major irritant in the state’s legislative process—whether for politically motivated reasons or due to genuine constitutional concerns. The Supreme Court, in its judgment, suggested that Governors must act within one to three months at various stages. So, to make the process more drawn-out, a Governor can first take the maximum permissible time before deciding whether to assent or withhold assent. If they wish to prolong it further, they are more likely to withhold assent rather than sign.

After a bill is re-passed and comes back to them, they can take additional weeks—or even months—before granting assent. This delay can be justified by raising queries, seeking clarifications, or claiming to “study” the bill. In practice, such tactics can stall even routine legislation for months.

The most powerful tool, however, is the ability to reserve a bill for the President. A Governor may do this if they believe the bill violates the Constitution, affects the national interest, or undermines the powers of the High Court. Once this is done, the Governor is no longer in the picture. The final decision lies with the President—who acts on the advice of the Union government.

Article 201 of the Constitution says: “When a Bill is reserved by a Governor for the consideration of the President, the President shall declare either that he assents to the Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom…”

Like the Governor, the President also has the option of sending the bill (with a message) back to the state legislature for reconsideration. But the similarities end there. Unlike Article 200—which requires a Governor to assent to a re-passed bill—Article 201 imposes no such obligation on the President. So even after the state legislature reconsiders and re-sends the bill, the President can still withhold assent.

None of the constitutional constraints that apply to Governors apply to the President. And the Supreme Court’s ruling does not address the President’s discretion in this regard. That means the President can choose to withhold assent—or simply sit on the bill—for months or even years. If the President takes no action, the bill remains in limbo, and the state has no constitutional recourse. This makes the President’s desk the most effective tool for the Centre to stall or stop a state law it strongly opposes.

This has already happened in multiple states. In Punjab, several bills—including those relating to university governance and Sikh Gurdwaras—were reserved for the President’s consideration. Months later, the status of some of these bills remains unclear. In Tamil Nadu, a similar situation occurred when the Governor reserved re-passed bills for the President—prompting the Supreme Court to step in and declare such actions unconstitutional. But even in that case, the initial delays gave the Centre a de facto veto for a significant period.

So, even after the Supreme Court’s intervention, the Centre—acting through a sympathetic Governor—still holds real influence over a state’s legislative agenda. By delaying action, withholding assent once, or sending politically sensitive bills to the President, a Governor can ensure that a state’s legislative will is slowed down—or, in some cases, stopped altogether, for wrong or right reasons.